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We first review recent work from our laboratory, which construes hypnotizability as an example of 
a more general trait of capacity for phenomenological control, which people can use to create 
subjective experiences in many non-hypnotic contexts where those experiences fulfill people’s 
goals. Second, we review recent work, which construes phenomenological control as a specifically 
metacognitive process, where intentional cognitive and motor action occurs without awareness of 
specific intentions (cold control theory). In terms of the reach of phenomenological control, we 
argue that various laboratory phenomena, namely vicarious pain, mirror-touch synesthesia, and the 
rubber hand illusion are to an unknown degree a construction of phenomenological control. The 
argument can of course be extended in principle to other findings. In terms of the reach of cold 
control, we present a new theory of intentional binding and show how intentional binding can 
measure the absence of conscious intentions in the hypnotic context. We obtain no evidence that 
cold control confers abilities beyond the changes in the metacognitive monitoring it postulates, and 
we explore the negative correlation between mindfulness and cold control viewed as a lack of 
mindfulness of intentions. 








 People have to varying degrees the ability to change what they experience: They can make 
normally voluntary actions feel involuntary (the illusion of involuntariness; cf. Polito, Barnier, & 
Woody, 2013); they can make imagination feel like perception (hallucination; McGeown, Venneri, 
Kirsch, Nocetti, et al., 2012); and they can make pretense feel like belief (delusion; cf. Connors, 
Barnier, Langdon, & Coltheart, 2015). Further, people have the capacity to control all these 
subjective experiences in ways consistent with their plans and goals (e.g. Lynn & Sivec, 1992; 
Sheehan & McConkey, 1982). We call this individual difference the capacity for phenomenological 
control. Phenomenological control is the ability to control subjective experience so that a 
constructed counterfactual state of affairs appears real.  It is not a new concept. We as a community 
have been calling it hypnotizability (in the context of hypnotic inductions) or suggestibility. But 
“hypnosis” refers to sleep, which is unrelated to phenomenological control (e.g. Banyai & Hilgard, 
1976); and “suggestibility” implies being manipulated contrary to one’s real intentions, a gullibility 
that is little related to hypnotic response (e.g. Coe, Kobayashi, & Howard, 1973; Moore, 1964). So 
in our laboratory, we have begun to refer to hypnotic suggestibility in a more general context as the 
capacity for phenomenological control and, correspondingly, hypnotic response as an example of 
phenomenological control. 
 We will review recent work in our laboratory that falls into two themes. First we review evidence 
that phenomenological control may be a pervasive feature of response in many psychological 
experiments. All experiments have demand characteristics, and certain people can use those demand 
characteristics to create relevant phenomenology (Orne, 1962). Thus, the finding that subjects have 
genuine experiences, and the corresponding physiological responses, is entirely consistent with the  
idea that demand characteristics associated with the experimental paradigm produce the phenomena 
investigated. We will review some key examples (reported in Lush, Botan, Scott, Seth, et al., 2019). 
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 Second, we propose a theory of phenomenological control (including its expression in a hypnotic 
context as hypnotic response), namely cold control theory (Dienes & Perner, 2007). According to 
cold control theory, phenomenological control is produced by an intention one is not aware of. We 
will review the difference between the use of conscious and unconscious intentions in terms of a 
cognitive measure, intentional binding, presenting a new theory of intentional binding to 
complement cold control theory. We can thereby indicate when and how intentional binding relates 
to the conscious status of intentions and hence to phenomenological control (Lush, Roseboom, 
Cleeremans, Scott, et al., 2019). We will consider what intentions could be used when 
phenomenological control seems to exert powerful effects on processes that are difficult to control, 
as indexed by the Stroop effect, in apparent conflict with cold control theory (Raz, Shapiro, Fan, & 
Posner, 2002). We will consider the difference between conscious and unconscious intentions in 
terms of their effectiveness in influencing the Stroop effect, as a test of cold control theory (Palfi, 
Parris, McLatchie, Kekecs, et al., 2018). Finally, we will consider the relation of, on the one hand, 
mindfulness, construed as being aware of mental states, including intentions, and, on the other hand, 
cold control, construed as being unaware of a relevant intention (see also Raz & Lifshitz, 2016). 
Specifically we consider preliminary work on the causal effect of mindfulness training on the 
capacity to have unconscious intentions, and hence experience phenomenological control. For 
studies not yet published we will give brief indication of the key effects found. 
The reach of phenomenological control 
 
 Martin Orne coined the term “demand characteristics” when thinking about the determinants of 
the behavior of people in hypnosis experiments , and generalized the concept to any experimental 
paradigm in psychology. He wrote, “It became clear from extensive interviews with subjects that 
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response to the demand characteristics is not merely conscious compliance. When we speak of 
"playing the role of a good experimental subject," we use the concept analogously to the way in 
which Sarbin (1950) describes role playing in hypnosis: namely, largely on a nonconscious level” 
(Orne 1962 p. 779). That is, participants will often strive to fulfil the role of a good subject by 
creating genuine experiences, without realizing they are doing so, in order to accomplish what they 
believe the experiment requires of them.  That participants are likely to create genuine experiences 
to fulfil the demand characteristics of experimental paradigms outside of the hypnotic context 
follows from many theoretical approaches to hypnosis (e.g. Barber, Spanos, & Chaves, 1974; E. R. 
Hilgard, 1977; Kirsch, 1985; Lynn, Rhue, & Weekes, 1990). Kirsch and Council (1989) and 
Michael, Garry, and Kirsch (2012) pointed out how important this point could be for understanding 
the results of psychology experiments generally. We believe the possibly dramatic implications of 
this point have been insufficiently appreciated. We consider the implications for vicarious pain, 
mirror touch synaesthesia, and the rubber hand illusion, respectively. 
  To investigate the role of the capacity for phenomenological control to produce these 
phenomena we measured hypnotic suggestibility with the Sussex-Waterloo Scale of 
Hypnotizsability (SWASH; Lush, Moga, McLatchie, & Dienes, 2018; see also Palfi, Moga, Lush, 
Scott, et al.,2019). This is a scale of hypnotic response, because it is defined as such to participants 
and a hypnotic induction is given. In order to measure phenomenological control without begging 
the question of altered states, or having results colored by people’s false beliefs about hypnosis, it 
would be desirable to have a scale that measured phenomenological control on its own terms. 
Wilson and Barber (1978) presented the Creative Imagination Scale, which has no induction. 
However, “creative imagination,” as a term, does not neatly describe the ability of people to alter 
their subjective experience (as opposed to say, enjoying writing novels) (see also McConkey, 
Sheehan,  & White, 1979). Following in the footsteps of Wilson and Barber, we will create a 
version of SWASH in which there is no induction, and it is presented to participants as an exercise 
in using their imagination to alter their subjective experience (the Phenomenological Control 
Scale). We measure hypnotic suggestibility as an index of the capacity for phenomenological 
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control. Bear in mind that we do not believe that the phenomena we review below were produced by 
participants simply being compliant, gullible or suggestible in a broad sense (though this may be a 
component of the effect); rather, they actively exercised their capacity for phenomenological control 
in order to fulfil their aims of experiencing the phenomena the situation called for. In the first two 
examples (vicarious pain and mirror touch synaesthesia), the SWASH was administered in a 
completely different context by different experimenters than the context in which vicarious pain 
and mirror touch synaesthesia were measured (indeed, at the time it was not envisioned that the data 
sets would be compared). Thus, the relation between the measures will not itself have been 
produced by demand characteristics (cf. Council, Kirsch, & Hafner, 1986). Rather, we argue all 
measures reflect at least in part a common way of responding to demand characteristics. 
 Vicarious pain. Vicarious pain perception (or mirror-pain) is a phenomenon in which physical pain 
 
observed in others is reported as felt by the observer (Fitzgibbon, Giummarra, Georgiou-
Karistianis, Enticott, et al., 2010). Lush, Botan, et al (2019) combined databases of participants 
screened for vicarious pain on the Vicarious Pain Questionnaire (VPQ; Botan, Fan, Critchley & 
Ward, 2018; Grice-Jackson, Critchley, Banissy & Ward, 2017) with a database of participants 
screened for hypnotizability using the SWASH at Sussex University; 404 participant’s scores were 
matched. The SWASH score is an average subjective rating (0 no experienced effect of suggestion 
to 5, maximal effect). To measure vicarious pain, participants watched 16 short video clips of 
people experiencing physical pain (e.g. falls, sports injuries, injections). The total pain score was 
the number of videos from 0-16 for which participants reported a bodily sensation of pain. Lush et 
al. found hypnotizability predicted total pain response, b = 1.25 videos/unit SWASH, 95% CI [.8, 
1.7], r = 0.27. The strength of this relation is approximately the same as the correlation of an 
individual hypnosis scale item with the rest of the scale with the item removed (taking the median 
over all items, correlation for objective scoring .22; for subjective scoring, .54; Lush et al, 2018). 
That is, the pain participants' felt in the vicarious pain paradigm may have arisen because they saw 
this as a situation in which they are meant to feel pain; and those with the capacity for 
phenomenological control could then create that pain as a genuine experience with corresponding 
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neural or physiological correlates (cf. Derbyshire, Whalley, Stenger, & Oakley, 2004). The same 
people may well have felt vicarious pain in everyday life, outside the laboratory context, for the 
same reasons. For example, a person may value empathic concern, and therefore when they see 
people in pain express that empathic concern by their capacity for phenomenological control. Just 
as in the hypnotic or laboratory context, a person can do this without being aware that they 
themselves are creating the experience. 
 Mirror touch synesthesia. In mirror touch synaesthesia, seeing someone being touched elicits a 
 
report of tactile sensation in the observer (Banissy & Ward, 2007). To measure mirror touch 
synaesthesia, participants watched 14 video clips including depictions of touch to a human (Ward, 
Schankenberg & Banissy, 2018). The mirror touch score is the number of videos for which 
participants felt sensations on their skin. Lush, Botan, et al. (2019) combined databases of 
participants screened for mirror touch synaesthesia (Ward et al., 2018) with a database of 
participants screened for hypnotizability using the SWASH at Sussex University;154 participants 
matched. Lush, Botan, et al. (2019) found that hypnotizability predicted mean number of mirror 
touch responses (out of 14), b = 0.83 videos per unit SWASH, 95% CI [.30, 1.37], r = .24. That is, 
at least part of the touch sensations that people felt may have been created as genuine experiences 
by the participants using their capacity for phenomenological control. 
 Rubber hand illusion. In the rubber hand illusion (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998), the sight of a rubber 
 
hand being brushed at the same time as feeling brushing on the real hand results in reports of a 
change in location of the subject’s hand toward the rubber hand and changes in subjective reports of 
ownership1.  Lush, Botan, et al. (2019) measured the rubber hand illusion on 353 participants and 
also tested them on SWASH. The rubber hand illusion was measured by stroking a rubber hand and 
a hidden real hand of a participant simultaneously; the participant then indicated the felt position of 
his or her actual hand, which drifts towards the rubber hand (drift measured in cm’s, 0- 60cm). The 
rubber hand illusion increased with hypnotizability, b = .58 cm per unit SWASH, 95% CI [.17, .98], 
 
1 1 The effect seems to be saying something so striking about how we construct our bodily self that the paradigm is well 
used: A search on Google Scholar with the quoted phrase “rubber hand illusion” yielded about 5,010 results, 5 August 
2019. 
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r = 0.15. The raw relationship is large given the mean amount of drift is 1.05 cm. Further, the 
correlation of SWASH with subjective ratings of the rubber hand illusion was 0.29,  95% CI [.19, 
.38]. We also measured people’s expectation that they would experience the rubber hand illusion 
(on a -3 to +3 scale). We found that people reported strong expectations that they would do so, and 
these expectations correlated with the extent to which they felt the illusion (b= 0.33 rating units/unit 
expectancy, 95% CI [.20, .47]). That is, there were clear demand characteristics readily perceived 
by participants. Moreover, Lush (2020) used the “pre-experimental inquiry” method of Orne (1962) 
to show the extent of the demand characteristics: Participants who had not taken part in a rubber 
hand experiment were told the procedure, and asked to predict what would happen. Participants 
strongly expected real subjects to respond more strongly to synchronous than asynchronous 
stroking and to respond more strongly to the key subjective outcome measures rather than those 
used in previous research as control statements. Those subjects in an actual experiment capable and 
motivated to turn those demands into actual experiences may well do so. And indeed, the strength 
of relation between subjective experience on the rubber hand illusion and hypnotizability is about 
the same magnitude as the relation between any scale item on SWASH on the rest of the scale. That 
is, while we do know the extent to which phenomenological control plays a role in the rubber hand 
illusion, it remains open that the exercise of phenomenological control is a complete explanation of 
the extent to which people experience the illusion.  
 In summary, phenomenological control may be a pervasive way in which demand characteristics 
are turned into subjective experience, convincing both experimenter and participant of the reality of 
a phenomenon that may in fact be perhaps wholly constructed by the way the paradigm is 
presented. Dienes and Perner (2007) argued that in evolutionary terms people acquired the capacity 
for phenomenological control precisely to convince themselves and others of the reality of a 
particular phenomenon – namely, spirit worlds, by appearing to self and others to be possessed. To 
what extent phenomenological control plays a role in any experimental paradigm is of course an 
empirical issue that can be addressed by manipulating demand characteristics and measuring 
individual differences in capacity for phenomenological control. Work still needs to be done in 
determining just how much vicarious pain, mirror touch synesthesia and the rubber hand illusion are 
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expressions of phenomenological control and how much involve other mechanisms. We have not 
ruled out other mechanisms also being at work, the correlations are only suggestive; however, given 
the prior plausibility of phenomenological control being at least partly involved, the possibility that 
it explains everything should be considered. And work still needs to be done on many other 
phenomena to explore the contribution of phenomenological control, bearing in mind the process 
applies not only to the experimenter’s laboratory but also to everyday life (cf. Bell, Oakley, 
Halligan, & Deeley, 2011; Bryant, Guthrie, Moulds, Nixon et al., 2003; J. R. Hilgard, 1979). Life is 
a series of situations with requirements (Schank, & Abelson, 1977; Searle, 2003), requirements that 
may be met in part by the exercise of phenomenological control. The network of plans and 
intentions that leads to a specific experience of phenomenological control may be a mix of 
conscious and unconscious states: For example, the desire to experience numbness in one’s arm to 
deal with guilt may be conscious or unconscious, and the person may or may not be aware of the 




The reach of cold control 
 The views of Hilgard (1977) and Spanos (1986) represented the main opposing theoretical 
camps of a golden age of hypnosis research, when many key ideas and phenomena were established 
(for later theoretical and empirical development, see e.g. Lynn, Green, Polizzi, Ellenberg, et al., 
2019; Nash & Barnier, 2008). Despite seeing themselves as opposing camps, Hilgard and Spanos 
expressed some common views: They postulated that the key mechanism by which hypnotic 
responses happen involved the subject strategically acting on intentions but being unaware of those 
intentions (see e.g. Hilgard, p 232; Spanos, p 490). Dienes and Perner (2007) took that common 
core and asked how far could we go if this core was the only defining mechanism of hypnotic 
response (and hence, more generally, of phenomenological control). That is, hypnotic response may 
consist in intending to perform the cognitive or motor action required for successful response, while 
remaining strategically unaware of that intention, a process Dienes and Perner called cold control 
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(see also Lynn et al., 1990, for a similar approach). The claim is not vacuous. Cold control asserts 
that what makes a response hypnotic is purely meta-cognitive (Dienes, 2012). Anyone can raise an 
arm. But the reason an arm rising in response to a hypnotic suggestion is hypnotic is because one is 
strategically unaware of the intention to raise it, despite sustained reflection (as shown e.g. by 
responding when being challenged, Lynn, Nash, Rhue, Frauman, et al., 1984; Spanos, Radtke, & 
Bertrand, 1984), so it appears to rise by itself. Crucially, one has the inaccurate thought that one did 
not intend it. A motor action, where one is strategically unaware of the intention to produce it, gives 
rise to the illusion of involuntariness; perceptual imagination, where one is strategically unaware of 
the intention to imagine, gives rise to hallucination; and pretense, where one is strategically 
unaware of the intention to pretend, gives rise to delusion. 
 If hypnotic response, and phenomenological control, more generally, is a matter of 
metacognition of intentions, then relations should hold between the metacognition of intentions, on 
the one hand, and hypnotic response and hypnotizsability, on the other (cf. Lush, Naish, & Dienes, 
2016; Terhune & Hedman, 2017). We have recently explored those relations in three main ways. 
First, we have explored the relation between hypnotic response and a putative implicit or objective 
measure of the sense of agency, called intentional binding. Second, we have explored if hypnotic 
response involves gaining abilities compared with non-hypnotic response; the claim of cold control 
theory is that the only processes that differ between hypnotic and non-hypnotic response are meta-
cognitive ones, so there should be no differences in non-metacognitive abilities. And third, we have 
explored whether training people to be mindful, and hence more metacognitively aware of their 
intentions, would reduce their ability to respond hypnotically (see also Dienes et al., 2016 for other 
relevant evidence on the relation between metacognition of intentions and hypnotic response). Here 
we focus on recent evidence from our laboratory regarding cold control. 
 Intentional binding. Is there a cognitive measure sensitive to whether an action is performed by  
way of a conscious intention? Lush, Roseboom, et al (2019) argue for a model indicating how 
intentional binding can indirectly act as such a measure. Intentional binding refers to the compression 
of the perceived interval between the reported times of actions and their outcomes (Haggard, Clark & 
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Kalogeras, 2002) and has been taken as a measure of sense of agency (e.g. Haggard, 2017), with 
some controversy (e.g. Buehner, 2012; Suzuki, Lush, Seth, & Roseboom, 2019)
2
. In the paradigm, the 
participant presses a button (the action) that is followed 250ms later by a tone (the outcome). The 
time of the action and the outcome are also reported on separate trials. The basic effect is that when 
the outcome and the action both occur, the estimated time of each is pulled towards the objective 
time of the other. The change in the estimated timing of the outcome is called “outcome binding” and 
the change in the estimated timing of the action is called “action binding.” 
 Why might these changes occur? Lush, Roseboom, et al. propose that people may have prior 
knowledge that button presses produce their outcomes very rapidly afterwards, maybe say in a 
100ms. Given this knowledge, evidence for the time of either event can be used to refine the time 
estimate of the other event by Bayesian cue combination. That is, the estimate of the time of the 
outcome, for example, will be pulled towards the time of the action (“outcome binding”), and the 
degree to which that happens will depend on the precision of the evidence for the time of each event. 
The more precise the evidence for the time of the action, the more the estimate of the time of the 
outcome will be pulled towards the action (i.e. the greater the outcome binding will be). Conversely, 
the more precise the evidence for the time of the action, the less the estimate of the action will be 
pulled towards the outcome (i.e. the less the action binding will be). 
 What does this have to do with conscious versus unconscious intentions? We add the assumption 
that conscious rather than unconscious states have properties more accessible to further processing 
(e.g., Cleeremans & Jimenez, 2002). For example, conscious rather than unconscious intentions will 
have greater precision in the information about their own timing; and an intention being conscious 
will thereby help in more precisely timing an action. Thus, consciously intended actions will have 
greater outcome binding and less action binding than actions with only unconscious intentions (note 
we predict opposite effects on the different binding components, unlike other theories of binding; 
see Moore, & Obhi, 2012, for a review of theories). Our model explains how intentional binding 
 
2 1 Because of its use as an implicit measure of sense of agency, the paradigm has been well used: A search of Google 
Scholar with the quoted term “intentional binding” yielded about 1,300 results, 5 August 2019. 
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can be a measure of sense of agency in a specific sense; namely, it can be sensitive to the presence 
of conscious intentions, as mediated by their effect on the precision of action timings, and this 
expresses itself in action and outcome binding in opposite ways. Yet it does this by taking into 
account people’s knowledge of causal relations (Buehner, 2012), so the model can accommodate 
both researchers who regard intentional binding as a measure of sense of agency (e.g. Haggard, 
2017) and those who regard it primarily as a measure of perceived causal relation (Buehner, 2012). 
 According to cold control theory, a hypnotic response involves unconscious intentions. Lush, 
Roseboom, et al. (2019) conjectured that hypnotizability may involve trait differences in the 
tendency to have conscious intentions. We tested 35 high hypnotizable and 35 low hypnotizable 
participants on intentional binding. Our results supported the hypothesis: Compared to low 
hypnotizable participants, high hypnotizable participants' judgements of the timing of intentional 
actions were more variable, supporting the claim that highs are habitually less precise in action 
timing than lows. Crucially, highs' action binding was stronger compared with lows (and 
numerically lower outcome binding, but the evidence was insensitive, based on Bayes factors). 
Further, the relative precision of action, rather than outcome judgments, predicted action and 
outcome binding in opposite ways, just as theoretically expected. In sum, our findings support the 
conjecture that the trait tendency to be less aware of intentions is related to hypnotizability. 
 As the fundamental mechanism for hypnotic response according to cold control theory is being 
unaware of intentions, a hypnotically performed action should produce more action binding and less 
outcome binding. Lush, Caspar, Cleeremans, Haggard, et al. (2017) asked high hypnotizable 
participants to press a button voluntarily (active condition), or to press the button posthypnotically 
in a way that felt involuntary (posthypnotic condition), or to let their finger be pulled down for them 
(passive condition). There was less outcome binding in the passive rather than active condition, 
consistent with the postulated role of conscious intentions in enhancing outcome binding. Crucially, 
the posthypnotic condition also involved less outcome binding than the active condition, consistent 
with the postulated lack of conscious intentions in the posthypnotic condition. For action binding, 
the evidence was insensitive, as indexed by Bayesian analysis, so counted neither for nor against 
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the theory. Further, the precision for action timing judgments was lower for posthypnotic than 
voluntary action, consistent with the role of conscious intentions in specifically changing action 
precision3. 
 
 Hypnotic ability to reduce the Stroop effect. According to cold control theory, 
phenomenological control entails doing the acts one could normally do, but being unaware of the 
intention to do them. However, an experimental finding, the word blindness effect (Raz, Shapiro, 
Fan & Posner, 2002;  Parris, Dienes & Hodgson, 2012, first used the term) suggests that highs can 
acquire abilities through hypnosis that they do not possess when responding non-hypnotically. The 
word blindness suggestion is that the subjects will see words as meaningless characters, or as words 
of a foreign language, while they are engaged in a color naming Stroop task. Various independent 
laboratories have documented that when this suggestion is given to high hypnotizable participants, 
they can decrease Stroop interference (measured by the difference in response times between the 
incongruent and neutral trials) compared to their own performance in a non-hypnotic condition (see 
Palfi et al, 2017). That is, highs appear to acquire better control when they use phenomenological 
control than when they do not. It might be thought that cold control theory could be protected from 
refutation if it were shown that the word blindness suggestion had comparable effects without a 
hypnotic induction.  Indeed Raz, Kirsch, Pollard and Nitkin-Kaner (2006) obtained substantial 
reduction in Stroop interference with the word blindness suggestion whether or not an induction 
was given (see also Parris & Dienes, 2013). However, no induction is needed for people to use 
phenomenological control (Kirsch, Mazzoni, & Montgomery, 2007; see also the previous section on 
the reach of phenomenological control). So the challenge to cold control theory remains. Subjects 
 
3 Acton precision was indexed by measuring the within- participant standard deviation of action timing judgements 
– the higher the within-participant SD, the lower the precision. The within-subject SD which was higher for 
posthypnotic (133.5 ms) than voluntary action (81.7 ms), 95% CI on difference: [10.7, 92.8]. A Bayes factor 
calculated with H1 modelled on the difference in action timing SD between voluntary and passive action in medium 
hypnotiszbles (12.6 ms) showed sensitive evidence for an increase in action timing SD in posthypnotic compared to 
voluntary action in high hypnotizables who reported post-hypnotic experience of involuntariness, t(9) = 2.85, p = 
.019, BH(0,.13), = 6.08. A Bayes factor indicates moderate evidence for H1 over H0 when above about 3 (Dienes, 
2014). There was no evidence one way or the other for whether the posthypnotic condition (133.5 ms) was different 
from the passive condition (113.5ms), t(9) = 1.51, p = 0.17, BH(0,.13), = 0.61. Bayes factors below 1/3 are moderate 
evidence for H0 over H1, Thus, the theory currently makes no prediction about a binding difference between the 
posthypnotic and passive conditions.   
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may have used their capacity for phenomenological control whether or not an induction was used. 
Thus, the word blindness effect presents a challenge for any theory that states the exercise of 
phenomenological control does not give one any special abilities beyond a change in subjective 
experience. 
 Perhaps in order to fulfil the requirement of believing the words are not meaningful, subjects 
realize they need to control Stroop interference, and to do so they use a simple strategy. For 
example, they could blur the eyes or look to one side. Raz, Landzberg, Schweizer, Zephrani, et al. 
(2003) provided evidence against the use of the blurring strategy by applying the drug cyclopegia to 
the eyes, which hinders the ability to change visual focus. When the words were put in focus with 
lenses, the word blindness effect was still obtained. This finding is intriguing. However, there was 
no manipulation check to show that blurring was rendered impossible. Video recordings reportedly 
showed no attempts to look away. However, there was no quality check of what angular distance 
from initial fixation the researches could detect. Thus, we thought the notion of simple strategies 
could be explored further.  
 We (Palfi, Parris, Collins, & Dienes, 2019) instructed people outside the hypnotic context to 
engage in a range of strategies while performing the Stroop task to see if we could replicate the 
effect of the word blindness suggestion without giving the suggestion. Fifty-seven participants were 
asked in different blocks of the Stroop task to blur their eyes, look at the top right-hand corner of 
the screen, focus on the last letter of each word, and maintain goal focus by repeating “display 
color”. The first two strategies, blurring and looking way, reduced Stroop interference as much as 
the word blindness suggestion, for the full range of hypnotizability (measured by the SWASH in a 
different experiment). For example, participants reduced Stroop interference by 65 ms by looking 
away and by 33 ms for blurring (the evidence was insensitive for the other strategies); by 
comparison, in the same laboratory, Palfi et al. (2018) found a word blindness effect of 34 ms. If 
people were engaging in such simple strategies when fulfilling the requirements of the word 
blindness suggestion, cold control theory is not in trouble. It would just be a matter of using these 
strategies, which anyone can use, and not knowing one is intending to do so.  
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 Just when we thought we had solved the mystery, a closer look at the data revealed otherwise. A 
remarkable aspect of the effect of the word blindness suggestion is that it lowers reaction times to 
specifically incongruent stimuli. However, RTs seemed to increase for all stimuli types for people 
using one of our instructed strategies versus no strategy. There was evidence for no decrease in RTs 
for incongruent stimuli. We preregistered a follow up experiment; 35 participants used only the 
strategies we had strongest evidence for (blurring and looking away), and indeed we found 
evidence that reaction times increased for incongruent trials (by 31ms and 47ms for blurring and 
looking away, respectively), rather unlike the effect of the word blindness suggestion (e.g., a 
reduction of 78ms in incongruent RTs was observed by Palfi et al., 2018, pilot). We also tested 
another model on existing word blindness suggestion data: maybe for the suggestion, people simply 
sped up, thereby condensing the Stroop effect (cf. Pratte, Rouder, Morey, & Feng, 2010). But this 
did not fit either. 
  A remaining option is that the strategy consists in just what the suggestion asks subjects 
to do. Namely, imagining a pretend world in which the script is meaningless itself resets the top-
down control mechanisms so that Stroop interference is reduced. In that case, voluntarily imagining 
this world would be as effective as the word blindness suggestion in reducing the Stroop effect. The 
reduction in the Stroop effect would then be interesting, but not a consequence of 
phenomenological control per se. It would be a consequence of imagining the situation as being a 
certain way. That is, the crucial test of cold control theory is comparing subjects using 
phenomenological control to create a perceived world, on the one hand, with implementing the 
same pretense as a voluntary strategy experienced as pretense or imagination, on the other. Palfi et 
al. (2018) have a Stage I Registered Report4  accepted to conduct this crucial test of cold control 
theory. Highs performed the Stroop test under three conditions: no suggestion condition; with the 
word blindness suggestion (suggestion condition); and also a volition condition in which 
participants were told to voluntarily imagine the words as meaningless (being told “to voluntarily 
strongly and clearly imagine the irrelevant words as gibberish … You can do this so that it is under 
 
4  That is, our introduction, method and analytic pipeline have been set in stone as agreed by reviewers; publication is in 
principle accepted for the final results, given they are sensitive enough, regardless of which direction they go. 
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your control, just by exercising your imagination. You can be aware it is your imagination at the 
same time as it produces powerful effects.”). We have not finished running all participants, but 
preliminary findings with 36 highs are as follows. First, as intended, participants experienced more 
control over the meaningfulness of the words when they responded to the volitional request than 
when they responded to the suggestion (2.1 vs 1.5 on a 0-3 scale of degree of experienced control). 
Moreover, participants experienced the meaninglessness of the script in the volition condition 
mostly as imagination, whereas they experienced it in the suggestion condition mostly as perception 
(1.78 vs 1.30 on a 0-3 scale, where {0,1} indicates a perceptual experience and {2,3} an imaginary 
one). The Stroop interference effect for the baseline condition was 99 ms; for the suggestion 
condition 67 ms. There was evidence for this difference (t(35) = 2.20, p = .035, 95% CI on 
difference [3, 62 ms], BH(0, 30) = 5.56
5). That is, we obtained the word blindness suggestion effect. 
Now we are left with the crucial question: what happens to the Stroop interference in the volition 
condition? It was 75 ms. While similar in size to the suggestion condition (67 ms), the data are thus 
far non-evidential in supporting either the claim of no difference between suggestion and volition 
conditions or the claim of a difference, t(35) = 0.66, 95%, p = 0.51, CI [-24, 40 ms], BH(0, 30) = 0.65. 
So we continue running participants until Bayesian sensitivity is achieved. So far, cold control 
theory has escaped refutation. Cold control theory would be corroborated if Bayesian evidence for 
H0 is obtained; refuted, at least in simplest form, if Bayesian evidence for H1 is obtained. 
 
 
Mindfulness and hypnotic response. How is mindfulness related to phenomenological control? On 
 
the one hand, both seem to involve changing the control of one’s mind, perhaps in part via 
attentional regulation, and both can engender changes in subjective experiences (see Raz & 
Lipshitz, 2016, for various approaches to the relation between hypnosis and meditation). According 
to cold control theory, however, phenomenological control is precisely not being mindful of 
 
5 This B is a Bayes factor; if it is less than 1/3 there is moderate evidence for H0 over H1; and if greater than 3, moderate 
evidence for H1 over H0 (see Dienes, 2014). Because it is close to 1, there is not much evidence either way. We will 
continue running until it is either over 3 or less than 1/3, or we reach 60 participants. See Palfi et al. (2017) for further 
description and its preregistration. Following a review in Parris, Dienes and Hodgson (2013), we modeled the expected 
size of the word blindness effect as about half the overall interference effect. 
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specific intentions, so there is a conflict between mindfulness and phenomenological control 
(Semmens- Wheeler & Dienes, 2012).  Lush (2019) tested 412 people in our SWASH database on 
various questionnaires, including a well-known mindfulness questionnaire, the FFMQ (Baer, 
Smith, Hopkins, Krietemeyer, et al., 2006). The questionnaires were completed in a different 
context from the hypnosis screening, by a different experimenter, which is a methodological 
improvement on our previous work examining the relation between mindfulness and 
hypnotizability, in which we found a negative correlation (Dienes, Lush, Semmens-Wheeler, 
Parkinson, et al., 2016). The FFMQ assesses five facets of mindfulness. Of these, specifically 
‘acting with awareness’ (AA), appears to measure awareness of intentions (e.g. “I do jobs or tasks 
automatically without being aware of what I’m doing”). Indeed, Lush (2019) found that AA 
specifically correlated with hypnotic response. We estimated the slope for acting with awareness as 
a decrease of 0.13 rating units of subjective score for SWASH (on a 0-5 Likert scale) for a one 
Likert unit change in AA (95% CI [.02, .24]; r = -.12). This negative relation is consistent with the 
claim that one way of being high in phenomenological control is by being habitually low in 
awareness of intentions (cf Lush, Roseboom, et al’s, in press, work on intentional binding, 
discussed above). This result is correlational (and allows plenty of cases where a person is high on 
both constructs or low on both: One can be a mindful high). To test causality, an experimental 
intervention is important. 
 Cavanagh, Strauss, Cicconi, Griffiths, et al. (2013) showed that a two-week online mindfulness 
intervention produced a change in FFMQ of 0.14 Likert units compared to a waiting list control. In 
a separate study we based a new intervention on theirs, but introduced a distinction between being 
mindful of mental states (one intervention) vs being mindful of the world (an active control 
intervention) (see Dienes et al., 2016, for the background and plan of the experiment). The mental 
states condition involved exercises in being aware of one’s mental states over a two- week period, 
and access to a website with supporting materials. The world condition was similar in all respects 
except participants practiced being mindful of the world, and the supporting materials explained 
mindfulness accordingly. Being mindful of the world, without being mindful of mental states, 
should not be in tension with phenomenological control, according to cold control theory, because 
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phenomenological control involves not being mindful of specifically a mental state (an intention). 





control 0.10 (0.12) n = 33 
world 0.16 (0.10) n = 39 






Change in acting with awareness (AA) in 0-5 Likert units from pre-test to post-test. Participants 
were randomly assigned to a waiting list control, testing separated two weeks apart; a mindfulness 
of world practice for two weeks; or a mindfulness of mental states intervention for two weeks. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
 Consistent with the hypothesis that the mental state intervention increases mindfulness of 
intentions, the mental state group increased in AA compared to the waiting list control, t(76) = 2.06, p 
= .043, BH(0, 0.14) = 3.29; and compared to the world group, though the evidence was weak, t(72) = 
1.86, p = .067, BH(0,0.14) = 2.71. The mental state group increased AA by 0.35 Likert units more than 
the control group. Thus, we would expect a change in hypnotic response of 0.35 x -0.13 = - 
0.05 SWASH subjective units in the mental state group compared to the control group. (The -0.13 
SWASH units per AA units is based on Lush, 2019.) Did the change in mindfulness of mental 
states produce the predicted change in hypnotic response? The data for the change in subjective 
hypnotic response from pre-test to post-test are shown in Table 2. 
 
 
 SWASH  
 
6 1 Analysed as intention-to-treat, following Cavanagh et al (2014). For the raw data and hypnotic script see: 
https://osf.io/9np64/  The websites are: http://www.lifesci.sussex.ac.uk/home/Zoltan_Dienes/mindfulness./ (for world) and 
http://www.lifesci.sussex.ac.uk/home/Zoltan_Dienes/mindfulness../ (for mental states). 
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control -0.23 (0.13) n = 33 
world -0.07 (0.11) n = 39 




Change in SWASH subjective response in 0-5 Likert units from pre-test to post-test. The 
intervention was either nothing (waiting list control, testing separated two weeks apart); a 
mindfulness of world practice for two weeks; or a mindfulness of mental states intervention for two 
weeks. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
 The amount by which hypnotic response reduced in the mental states condition vs the control 
condition was -0.18 (SE = 0.18), t(60) = 1.00, p = .32, BH(0,.05) = 0.79, which is insensitive (that is, 
no conclusion follows)7. Indeed, based on the error variance in these data we can estimate we 
would need about 3,000 participants in total to have a 50% chance of getting good evidence for an 
effect should there be one of the size anticipated
8
. Although we did not obtain good evidence one 
way or another, we have learned that looking for a change in mindfulness causally changing 
hypnotic response will need a massive effort, only available to those who use institutions such as, 
for example, the psychological accelerator (https://psysciacc.org/). The correlational evidence, 
however, reveals a small and negative relation between the relevant mindfulness facet and hypnotic 
responsiveness. Thus, cold control theory has successfully pointed to which aspect of mindfulness 






 We have attempted to sketch two directions for the consciousness research community to 
 
7  Using the same logic for the comparison of the mental states with world group, the expected change in SWASH is 0.29 
AA units × 0.13 SWASH units/AA unit = 0.038 SWASH units.  There is no evidence one way or the other for a difference 
between the two intervention groups in SWASH, sample difference = -0.02, SE = 0.16, t(82) = 0.12, p = 0.90, BH(0, .038) = 
0.95. 
8 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=10Lsm_o_GRg for this calculation, and its generalization in Palfi and Dienes 
(2019, version 3, table 2). 
9 Though this was not pre-registered. A confirmatory study would be useful. 
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consider in at least part of its future research endeavor: First, to address the full reach of 
phenomenological control; and second, to consider how simple theories of phenomenological 
control, like cold control, could be tested and brought into contact with a range of literatures. The 
two directions stand alone, yet are complementary.  One may consider the reach of 
phenomenological control while being agnostic about theory; one certainly need not buy into 
specifically cold control theory. In exploring the first direction, referring to the individual difference 
capacity as the capacity for phenomenological control may not clarify anything for the hypnosis 
community, who already understand that the trait  involves the ability to alter subjective experience 
according to plans and goals. However, reaching the non-hypnosis community is a different matter. 
Informing them that an important research finding, such as the rubber hand illusion, may in part just 
be a product of suggestion may imply the finding is simply biased responding, compliance, or 
involves gullibility, or coercion, or they may believe that the claim that it is suggestion could be 
refuted by showing physiological correlates to the phenomenon (as if suggestion did not produce 
physiological correlates). And indeed suggestion may be a misleading word. The subjective 
experiences can be created by the subject for their own purposes, without there being an authority to 
suggest them as such. A ‘capacity for phenomenological control’ puts the trait in a positive light, 
which allows us to show our participants in a positive light too. 
 The first direction asks us to consider the full range of phenomena that may be constructed from 
demand characteristics and consider their correlation with the capacity for phenomenological 
control, measured, for example, by hypnotic suggestibility. This approach may apply to correlates of 
hypnotizability that have been used to indicate the skills or processes that hypnotizability consists 
of. For example, Martin, Sackur, and Dienes (2017) showed that the correlation of frequency of 
reversals of the Necker cube and hypnotizability was a product of demand characteristics; it wasn’t 
so much a skill that explained why people might be more hypnotizable as the reverse; it was 
hypnotizability that explained why people may change their experience of the Necker cube. 
 In the first section, we argued that the rubber hand illusion is in part a construction of 
phenomenological control, as an opposing theory to one postulating just the involvement of specific 
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mechanisms underling feelings of body ownership (Lush, Botan, et al., 2019). For example, if the 
rubber hand illusion is produced by phenomenological control, there is no need to postulate a 
specific cross-modal cue integration mechanism that produces feelings of ownership.  On the other 
hand, in the second section, we argued that Bayesian cue combination was the process underlying 
intentional binding, as a way of supporting a theory of hypnotizability (Lush, Roseboom, et al., 
2019). Why could not the altered experiences of time in intentional binding be a product of 
phenomenological control? This is an excellent question. In response, we point to two findings: 
That the rubber hand illusion was expected by participants, and those expectations predicted their 
response (Lush et al., 2019); and, conversely, the degree of outcome and action binding depended 
counter-intuitively on the relative precision of action timing (in opposite ways), as consistent with 
the Bayesian cue combination theory (Lush, Roseboom et al., 2019). We do not think these 
considerations settle the matter, however. Future research should determine how clear the demand 
characteristics are in the case of intentional binding. Demand characteristics expressing themselves 
through phenomenological control is such a simple theory that it should be a default explanation in 
any relevant case until its limitations are shown for that case. 
We argued that people should consider simple theories and showed in one case how such 
theories might make contact with a range of literatures and be quantitatively tested. For example, 
we showed how a correlational study could estimate an effect that then can be used to define a 
predicted effect size for a causal intervention study. When one can model the rough size of effect 
expected on H1, Bayesian evidence can be obtained for H0 and against H1; or for H1 and against 
H0 (Dienes, 2014). While p values can often approximate our needs for making the second claim 
(i.e. for H1 by getting a significant result), they cannot for the first, i.e. for getting evidence for H0 
(which is not in fact indicated by a non-significant result). And p values do not tell us when data are 
simply insensitive and so do not count against a theory at all. Bayes factors are very useful to 
determine this (see the study reviewed above on the effects of a mindfulness intervention; also for the 
comparison of different hypnotic inductions, Martin & Dienes, 2019). While cold control theory 
interests us because it is simple in that it claims that the only difference between an ordinary action 
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and a hypnotic one is meta-cognitive, it is not the only simple theory of hypnotic response, or of 
phenomenological control more generally. Even simpler is response expectancy theory (Kirsch, 
1985), according to which hypnotic response (and one could generalize to phenomenological 
control more generally) is directly caused by the expectation that it will happen.  
 In the Palfi et al. (2018) test of cold control, we obtained evidence for equivalent expectations in 
the suggestion and volition conditions (expectations both for subjective experiences of 
meaninglessness and for exerting control over interference); hence the study is simultaneously a 
test of response expectancy and cold control theories: Both cold control and response expectancy 
theory are corroborated if the Stroop interference is reduced equivalently in both conditions, and 
refuted if they are not. One reason we would still put cold control theory in the running is that it is 
consistent with the active nature of hypnotic response (e.g. Kirsch, Burgess, & Braffman, 1999; 
Tobias & Kihlstrom, 2010). There are other theories of hypnosis to be considered as well (See Nash 
& Barnier, 2008, for review). Recently, Martin and Pacherie (2019) proposed an intriguing model 
of hypnotic motor responses based on predictive processing theory. Dienes and Martin (2019) 
briefly indicate a possible simple test of this theory. 
 The prediction of cold control theory that phenomenological control does not entail being able to 
perform acts one could not do otherwise seems challenged by a number of findings beyond the word 
blindness effect. These findings all point to an effect of hypnosis on overcoming automatic processes. 
We now comment on some of these findings to indicate briefly how they may be addressed, though in 
all cases they be pointers to good ways of attacking cold control theory in future.  
Lifshitz, Aubert Bonn, Fischer, Kashem, et al. (2013) provided evidence that the McGurk effect, a 
putatively highly automatic process, could be overcome by posthypnotic suggestion. Remarkably, 
however, Getz (2019) presents evidence that the McGurk effect is a “product of individual differences 
and task demands.” The role of phenomenological control in producing the McGurk effect needs 
further exploration. Iani, Ricci, Gherri and Rubichi (2006) found a posthypnotic suggestion for focused 
attention could substantially reduce the flanker compatibility effect. However, the posthypnotic 
suggestion did this by increasing reaction time to compatible trials rather than reducing reaction time 
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to incompatible trials, a pattern that consistent with overall changes in reaction time modifying 
compatibility effects (Pratte et al., 2010). Polito, Barnier, and Connors (2018) found that a hypnotic 
suggestion for more randomness in producing a binary output did not increase random responding but 
a hypnotic suggestion for the subjects’ actions being controlled by an alien did, thereby allowing 
subjects to overcome the habits that led to non-random responding. What this shows is that subjects 
can overcome a habit given the right strategy; it was not shown that hypnosis added any new abilities.  
Terhune, Cardeña, and Lindgren (2010) presented a case study where a person’s synesthesia was 
amenable to cognitive control at a late perceptual stage when responding to a posthypnotic suggestion. 
However, it was not shown that posthypnotic suggestion enabled anything beyond the person's normal 
abilities. Cohen Kadosh, Henik, Catena, Walsh, et al. (2009) found that suggestion for digit-colour 
synesthesia rendered an achromatic digit harder to detect against a background colour which was the 
same as the suggested synesthetic colour. However, becoming less capable of performing an action as 
the situation requires is quite consistent with cold control theory. Anderson, Seth, Dienes, and& Ward 
(2014) tested whether suggested synesthesia could enhance performance. They investigated whether a 
hypnotic suggestion for digit-colour synesthesia facilitated subjects’ ability to detect targets in an 
embedded figures test. We had previously shown that natural digit-colour synesthetes were better at 
this task than controls. Despite our hypnotic subjects achieving comparable subjective experiences as 
natural synesthetes, the suggestion did not facilitate objective performance, consistent with cold 
control theory. 
 Our laboratory, along with all the work at the Sackler Centre for Consciousness science, has 
recently moved to preregistering all studies, using registered reports more often than in the past, and 
to providing data transparently at the point of submission of all empirical papers (see Allen & 
Mehler, 2019, for evidence for advantages of going to open science). Further, our laboratory has a 
policy of a “B for every p;” that is, we use use Bayesian analyses in order to be able to make 
symmetric inferences about both H0 and H1 (Dienes & McLatchie, 2018); we have illustrated the 
usefulness of Bayes factors for hypnosis research in this review. For example, in the final study we 
reviewed, examining the effect of causal manipulation of mindfulness, if one just considered the 
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non-significance of the intervention, one might have been tempted to conclude that the result 
counted against the theory; but it did not.
10
. We have found that adopting the reform agenda has 
helped us be careful in specifying and testing theories (cf Seth, & Hohwy, 2019). 
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